court appointed counsel in the pursuit of discretionary review;5 it chilled an indigent's exercise of his or her right to counsel by requiring, *Director of the Defender Services, National Legal Aid and Defenders Association. The author wishes to express his appreciation to Nancy E. as a condition of probation, the payment of state-incurred costs for appointed counsel ;4 it allowed a complete search of an individual who was stopped for a mere traffic offense;5 and it declined to enforce the exclusionary rule before a grand jury after an admittedly illegal search.e The Court overruled (sub silentio) Preston v. U.S. 7 by allowing a warrantless search of a car parked in a public lot one-half of a block from the police station." Also, this disinclination to uphold what the Warren Court found to be basic rights of each and every citizen led the seventies Court to uphold the "general articles" of military law (which provide punishment for behavior "unbecoming an officer") against a constitutional attack, resulting in the defendant's spending some five years of his life in prison for criticizing the Vietnam War while in uniform and for refusing to train Green Berets headed for Southeast Asia.
9
Note: through all this Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall filed their dissents.
It was not always so. At one time these Justices were part of the liberal majority who sat on the bench during the Warren years in the sixties. They, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Goldberg and later Fortas, were a court which made a fundamental contribution to the enforcement of the Bill of Rights by ordering that these liberties be observed in all courts of our land, federal or state.
It is often forgotten that, prior to the actions of the Warren Court, virtually none of the rights contained in the first ten amend4Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40 (1974 
.
ments were applied to Americans in state courts. Although they were always deemed available to defendants accused of federal offenses, these rights were denied to those accused of equally serious state offenses, as well as to all defendants in misdeameanor cases. In 1833 the issue as to whether the Bill of Rights was to be applied to state governments first came up. The Supreme Court held they were not.' 0 In 1865 Senator Howard and Congressman Bingham introduced legislation in both houses of Congress to force application of these amendments to defendants in state courts. These bills resulted in the passage of the fourteenth amendment. Nevertheless, the Court in decision after decision continued to hold that the Bill of Rights still did not apply to defendants charged in state courts."' It was not until the Court of the sixties and its doctrine of selective incorporation that the Bill of Rights received this wider application. In Justice Black's view, after the passage of the fourteenth amendment all of the constitutional liberties applied to state defendants. However Justice Harlan felt that the Bill of Rights should not become a straight jacket for our legal rights. Other Justices felt that there was no historical precedent which mandated their application in one fell swoop.' 2 The majority of the Warren Court did, however, accept the proposition that they could extend the eight key amendments to the states one at a time on a case-by-case basis whenever they determined that a specific provision was "fundamental to the American scheme of justice."13 Following this plan, the Warren Court, in 1961, determined in Mapp v. Ohio' 4 that the exclusionary rule was part and parcel of the fourth amendment and, as such, must be applied to the states. In 1962 the Court held that the eighth amendment "cruel and unusual punishment" clause was obligatory on the states. 
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I recite this litany to show that the Warren Court, far from making new law as has been charged in certain sectors of our country, in fact merely restored to the American people that which many Americans thought belonged to them back in 1791 after they made the Bill of Rights a condition precedent to their ratifying the Constitution. As Justice Black wrote:
The first ten amendments were proposed and adopted largely because of fear that Government might unduly interfere with prized individual liberties. The people wanted and demanded a Bill of Rights written into their Constitution.... The Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Amendments were pointedly aimed at confining exercise of power by courts and judges within precise boundaries, particularly in the procedure used for the trial of criminal cases. Brennan or Marhsall dissented in no less than 28 criminal cases this session, usually joining together.
Let us now try to analyze the cases in this term to see how they relate to cases decided by the Warren Court and earlier precedents.
Miranda in Trouble
The first case we shall discuss is the important case of Michigan v. Tucker, 2 8 in which the new Nixon majority attempts to restrict the scope of Miranda v. Arizona. 29 Miranda contained four admonitions that the police must give to a suspect taken into custody. The arrestee must be informed that (a) he has the privilege of remaining silent, (b) anything he says can and may be used against him, (c) he has a right to counsel during interrogation and (d) if he is indigent, the state will appoint counsel for him. It is this last warning which was not given to the defendant Tucker.
There is no question that the Miranda decision applied to the fact situation in Tucker. In determining the retroactivity and scope of Miranda, the Supreme Court held that all cases tried after June 13, 1966 (the date of the Miranda decision), would come under the Miranda order. Johnson v. New Jersey.
30 Although in Tucker the arrest and limited warnings took place prior to June 13, 1966, the case did not come to trial until after Miranda had taken effect.
Several of the Justices of the Burger majority seemed to think that inasmuch as these police warnings had been given prior to the date of the Miranda decision, the Court should not be too strict in applying those rules. After all, the statements which the defendant gave the police were not used against him at trial. Instead, a witness, whose name was disclosed to the police by Tucker during the custodial interrogation, was allowed to testify against the accused at trial. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, concluded that Miranda applies only to the using at trial of statements made by the defendant. It will not be used to exclude the testimony of the derivative witness, because the police were obviously unaware of the forth-coming Miranda decision when they interrogated the defendant and learned the identify of the witness.
This analysis fails, however, because it has always been clear that from June 13, 1966, to date, every case tried would be governed by the Miranda rules. To deviate from that doctrine at this late date without explicitly reversing the earlier decision is hypocrisy.
Of course the Tucker case is further complicated by another doctrine-fruit of the poisonous tree. Simply stated, it is that any evidence illegally derived cannot be used for any purpose whatsoever. This doctrine was first enunciated in Elkins v. United States 3 ' where the Court barred evidence taken illegally by federal officials from being used in a state court. It has been reaffirmed in cases such as Wong Sun v. United StateS3 2 where statements taken from a witness whose location had been illegally discovered were held to be inadmissible against the defendant for any purpose.
These two doctrines, Wong Sun and Miranda, were solid in the law until the date of this decision. Tucker, however, denies the enforcement of the poisoned fruit doctrine where a defendant had been given an incomplete Miranda warning. The fruit, the name of the supposed (but injurious) alibi witness, was not suppressed. The majority held that since the voluntariness of the witness' statements was not called into question, the testimony was admissible at trial.
In lone dissent 3 Justice Douglas pointed out that this decision weakens the thrust of both Miranda and of the doctrine of the fruit of the poisonous tree. This decision is wrong in that it flies in the face of the logic of both Miranda and Wong Sun. Furthermore it encourages the police to fail to give defendants their full Miranda warnings, with the hope that some information will be given from which they might derive damaging evidence at trial. This is contrary to the policy behind the Miranda decision. Miranda was an attempt to discourage the police from employing back room tactics (with physical and psychological rubber hoses), to discourage the police from not fully advising the accused of his or her rights and to erase the anomaly of the illiterate first offender hanging himself through ignorance of his rights while the syndicate gangster, with full knowledge and lawyers available, might walk the streets. while he was in his own apartment, six federal narcotics agents entered his premises without a warrant and without probable cause. They arrested Bivens for alleged narcotics violations. The petitioner was manacled in front of his wife and children while the agents threatened to arrest the entire family. The apartment was searched from stem to stem. This suit was brought by petitioner in federal district court for $15,000 in damages from each agent. The district court dismissed the case. 39 The court of appeals affirmed, 40 but the Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the dismissal. Chief Justice Burger, in dissent, pointed out that if deterrence was the rationale for the exclusionary rule, then this case illustrated the failure of that rule to deter the police from making improper searches and seizures. Therefore, he argued, the exclusionary rule ought to be abandoned, since it had failed to achieve the mission assigned to it.
Last term in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte 4 '
Justices Powell, Blackmun and Rehnquist, in a concurring opinion, questioned whether violations of the fourth amendment could be raised by way of collateral attack. The attack in Bivens was in dissent, in Schneckloth concurrence, but this term the Burger majority has launched an attack with more tangible results. The Court in Calandra v. United States abolished the exclusionary rule in the presentation of evidence to grand juries. Federal agents had illegally seized papers belonging to Calandra. These were presented to the grand jury. Calandra moved to suppress the material at this stage and asked that he not be required to answer any questions in front of the grand jury based on the suppressed evidence. The district court granted this motion; the court of appeals affirmed. trict court ordered the materials returned. The grand jury returned the papers, but attempted to recoup them by issuing a subpoena duces tecum. The Silverthornes refused to comply with the subpoena and were convicted of contempt. The United States Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Holmes, reversed this conviction, holding that "the essence of the provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court, but that it shall not be used at all. The majority of the Court held that the exclusionary rule should not apply to grand jury proceedings. They reasoned that the rule's deterrent effect on police misconduct was less important than protecting the grand jury proceedings from delay and disruption. The majority ignored the point made by the dissent that the exclusionary rule is not merely designed to deter police activity, but also attempts to give content and meaning to the fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures and to prevent the sanctioning of such misconduct by the courts. They pointed out that if the police were not allowed to use any confession obtained in violation of Miranda, there would be no incentive for the police to ever question a defendant without giving him his Miranda warnings. If, however, such a confession in the absence of the warnings could be utilized by the police or by the prosecution to "keep the defendant honest," some police officers might be tempted to take a confession in violation of Miranda so that it could at least be used for purposes of impeachment. So too after Calandra, the abolition of the exclusionary rule in grand jury proceedings leads police to believe that the results of improper searches and seizures will be admissible in court for some purposes and, therefore, might induce some police to violate the constitutional rights of citizens in the hope of achieving what they would consider a public good.
The dissenting justices were especially distressed by the majority's view sanctioning judicial condonation of improper acts by the police. They pointed out that one of the purposes of the exclusionary rule was to insure that courts are not made parties to lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of citizens by permitting unhindered governmental use of the fruits of such invasions. Furthermore, public confidence in the judiciary would be eroded if it participated in such unlawful acts.
Finally, Justice Brennan predicted that this decision will be used to "bootstrap" future decisions of the Court leading to the ultimate abolition of the exclusionary rule:
In Mapp, the Court thought it had "close Calandra decision, but its presence pervades other decisions of the Burger Court as well, as the civil liberties established in the sixties continue to be chipped away in the seventies in the new majority's search for law and order.
The End of the Equal Protection Doctrine for the Indigent
With this year's decision in Ross v. [Vol. 65 in Douglas). Moffitt was charged with two separate forgeries and had had court-appointed counsel at both trials. He appealed both cases to the North Carolina court of appeals and was provided counsel at public expense in both appeals. In one case the appointed counsel asked to be appointed to assist in filing a request for discretionary review by the North Carolina supreme court. In the other case the public defender took the case to the state supreme court, but review was denied. Request was made to the trial court for appointment of counsel for preparing a petition for writ of certiorari from 'the United States Supreme Court. In both -cases, the requests for counsel to complete the appellate process were denied. Moffitt sought collateral relief in the federal courts, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held unanimously that he was entitled to counsel in both cases. The Supreme Court reversed.
In order to understand the gravity of this decision and its effect upon the doctrine of equal protection as it applies to indigent -clients, one must first understand the rationale of the Douglas decision. It held that whatever avenue of review was available to a rich defendant must be equally available to an indigent. If the state supreme court did not review any criminal cases, the indigent would not need any special considerations. But the state court does provide such review, and the indigent does need special consideration as this review is undeniably costly. As Justice Rehn-,quist, writing for the majority in Moffitt, conceded, "The[se] decisions discussed above stand for the proposition that a state cannot arbitrarily cut off appeal rights for indigents while leaving open avenues of appeal for more affluent persons." 56 Therefore, if the state supreme court reviews petitions prepared by counsel retained by rich clients, it must, of necessity, be prepared to review petitions by in-,digents, and supply counsel when necessary to inake this review meaningful.
It is important to note that perhaps the hardest work in the law, requiring the greatest skill, is the formulating of petitions for review in the United States Supreme Court or in state supreme courts, where the court does not 50417 U.S. at 607.
have to hear every case presented to it. It requires the greatest ability of counsel to capsulize the arguments and raise the issues in a lawyer-like manner, to provide the court with a clearly framed problem, capable of forming the basis of a decision to grant or to deny review. As Justice Haynsworth put it in the Moffitt case in the court of appeals:
An indigent defendant is as much in need of assistance of a lawyer in preparing and filing a petition for a certiorari as he is in the handling of an appeal as of right. In many appeals, an articulate defendant could file an effective brief by telling his story in simple language without legalisms, but the technical requirement for applications for writs of certiorari are hazards which one untrained in the law could hardly be expected to negotiate. In the Supreme Court, Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall again dissented, quoting Justice Haynsworth at length. They concluded: Douglas v. California was grounded on concepts of fairness and equality. The right to discretionary review is a substantial one, and one where a lawyer can be of significant assistance to an indigent defendant. It was correctly perceived below that the "same concepts of fairness and equality, which require counsel in a first appeal of right, require counsel in other and subsequent discretionary appeals." 5 The import of this decision is clear. No longer will indigent defendants be able to pursue their rights of appeal through to the state or United States highest courts. An affluent accused can "take his case all they way up," but 57 483 F.2d at 653. 
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MARSHALL L HARTMAN the poor defendant must be satisfied with one chance.
The Question of Recoupment or "Chilling" the Right to Counsel
In 1972 the Supreme Court decided, in James v. Strange, 60 that a Kansas statute, requiring an indigent defendant to repay the state for the cost of appointed counsel, was unconstitutional in that its provision denied defendant/debtors the normal defenses of the voluntary debtor, thus amounting to a violation of the equal protection guaranteed to indigents. The defendant in Strange was ordered to pay $500 for the services of his court appointed attorney, should he become able to do so. Appeal of this order to a three-judge federal court was successful, and the statue was declared unconstitutional on its face, in that it would have a "chilling effect" on the exercise of the right to counsel. A poor defendant with a family might be afraid to fight his case fully, if he knows that the lawyer's fees would hang over his head, win or lose. Furthermore, since a jury trial would cost him more in attorney's fees than a trial to the bench, he might be inclined to forego the former "luxury." Such a situation would be antithetical to the reasoning of the Court in Griffin v. Illinois 6 ' where it was held that, "[T]he quality of justice should not depend upon a person's pocketbook." 62 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court sustained the finding of unconstitutionality, but on the narrower grounds of the defendant's position as debtor.
This term, in Fuller v. Oregon, 62 the Court held that an Oregon defendant could be given probation, conditioned upon his repayment of counsel and investigator fees should he be able to do so. The Oregon recoupment statute did not contain the provisions which were held unconstitutional in Strange. The Burger Court decided that this difference alleviated the taint, despite the point made by the dissent (Brennan and Marshall) that no other debtor could go to jail for defaulting, while Fuller's probation could be revoked for the same action.
It is important to note that none of the Jus-neither the right to counsel, nor the right to -confront the witnesses against him or her, are constitutionally guaranteed a prisoner. Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall, as in so many -of these cases, joined in dissent.
The Abolition of the Warrant Requirement in Automobile Cases
In Cardwell v. Lewis 69 the familiar six-to-'three configuration was given a welcome rest. A plurality of four justices 70 upheld the warrantless seizure of an automobile from a public parking lot while the defendant was held in -custody at the nearby police station. Defendant Lewis was suspected of murder. At the request of the police, he drove to the police station, parking his car in a commercial lot. He was -arrested, and the keys to his car and his parking lot claim ticket were taken from him. The warrantless search of the impounded car turned up incriminating evidence. The decision -of the Court upheld the use of this evidence at trial.
Justice Blackmun, for the plurality, argued that the search of an automobile is far less intrusive on fourth amendment rights of an individual than would be the search of his person or 'his house, thereore the standard in requiring warrants for these searches need not be as strict.
The dissenting Justices pointed out that although there is a line of cases establishing a precedent for distinguishing automobile search -cases from other searches, any distinction was based upon the mobility of the auto. In the -case at bar, it was argued, the car was inaccessible to the defendant, with no possibility of being moved.
The possible impact of this case on the warrant requirement, or absence thereof, in auto searches is highlighted by comparing it to the landmark Warren Court decision in what circumstances warrantless searches and seizures of automobiles would be allowed. Defendant Preston's conviction was reversed when the warrantless search of his car parked in a garage while he was in police custody was held to be in violation of his constitutional rights. The Court held that if a warrant were absent, the search was limited to one incident to an arrest or in specific exigent circumstances.
The Preston case would seem to be tacitly overruled by Cardwell. Certainly the care with which the Warren Court examined what used to be a special, limited exception to a general rule is no where in evidence in the plurality decision. Whether a later case with the compelling weight of a majority opinion will more clearly delineate the Court's position in this area remains to be seen.
Search of Dwellings
Consistent with its expansion of all exceptions until they threaten the existence of the rule, the Burger Court allowed a third-party consent for a search to justify the warrantless search of an entire house.
In where there was an opportunity to do so, absent any grave emergency (such as imminent loss of evidence or danger to human life or safety). The dissent further argued that the search in this case could never have been supported by a warrant describing with particularity the places and things to be searched. If the search could not have been authorized by warrant, "[i]t is inconceivable that a search conducted without a warrant can give more authority than a search conducted with a warrant." 74
According to justice Douglas, this case is a substantial departure from previous Supreme Court cases requiring special circumstances to support an exceptional, warrantless search. 
Fourth Amendment Rights on the Decline
The most serious step backward taken by the Burger Court, a step away from the belief that the Bill of Rights are guaranteed to each citizen in every court, is evidenced by the decisions in Robinson v. United States 77 and Gustafson v. Florida. 7 8 The question to be resolved was the scope of an allowable search of a person validly stopped and arrested for a traffic citation.
Three important points must be kept in mind while discussing these cases:
(1) There was a valid stop in each case, with no question as to probable cause; (2) There was only a search of the person, not an automobile search;
(3) The remaining constitutional question is limited to the allowable scope of such a search incident to a traffic arrest.
In Robinson a police officer stopped the defendant because it was believed that he was. driving without a current license. Probablecause for the arrest was conceded. The search. resulted in a crumpled cigarette pack being discovered in a coat pocket. Inside the pack,-opened by the officer, were 14 capsules of a substance later identified as heroin. The officer did not hesitate to open the pack, even though there was no claim that there was any fear of' a concealed weapon within.
In Gustafson the car which was stopped had. been observed weaving across the center line "three or four times." It also had out-of-stateplates. The driver, a student, was found to bewithout his operator's license. He was arrested,. and a search revealed a cigarette pack. The officer opened this and found marijuana ciga--rettes. Gustafson was charged with possession, and the marijuana was introduced against himat trial.
These cases departed from the rule established in a majority of jurisdictions, where the police could not conduct warrantless searchesof "mere traffic violators."
In dissent, the liberal minority of three conceded that the officer should have the right to. pat down any person stopped to protect the officer against hidden weapons, even a traffic arrestee. They made an analogy to stop-andfrisk decisions decided in past terms. They refused, however, to agree that any previouscases gave rise to the decisions in either case. (The majority rejected the stop-and-frisk analogy because those cases arose from situations without probable cause for arrest, while herethis was not argued.)
The implications of this decision are frightening. Every person driving a car who is stopped for a traffic violation may be spreadeagled and searched, with no particular object of the inspection ever formulated. Prior to. these cases, there was no encouragement for the police to conduct more than a mere patdown for weapons in traffic arrests. Now thatanything the police turns up can lead to a conviction, the police may be motivated to make [Vol. 65; FOREWORD: SUPREME COURT REVIEW (1974) arrests for manufactured traffic violations in order to search for possible contraband.
More important is the way the Burger Court achieves its objective of withdrawing from positions established in the sixties. Instead of a decision with integrity, admitting an affirmative will to change procedure, we are subjected to a review of the past cases, used to support a new position. For now the outlook remains ominous, at best a disturbing uncertainty. The pendulum continues, further and further from the liberal position of the sixties. Our hope lies in the expectation that it may soon reach the end of its tether and begin the long swing back.
